members@ginicoe.com
347 464 9144
G

Preparing Interface

Our Customers

Financial Institution

I am a Financial Institution. How Can Ginicoe Help Me? Click Me to Learn More.

Financial Institution

Regulated FIs

Mortgage Division Business Value to Regulated FIs 

  • Reduces high-density low-income areas.
  • Eliminate Appraisal Bias for conventional, jumbos, and gov't loans.
  • Increase CAMEL favorability rating (A & M) due to proactive fraud prevention and risk mitigation.
  • Reduces high concentration of minority residents.
  • Reduce your bad debt allowances due to fraud.
  • Reduce the racial wealth gap of income inequality.
  • Provides data for private ‘Special Purpose Credit Program’ (SPCP).
  • Implement private SoJOR™ to replace FHFA GSE participation of SPCP.
  • Reduce synthetic identity theft fraud.
  • Reduce Application fraud at the new accounts desk.
  • Reduce Anti-Money Laundering (AML) fraud.
  • Reduce Account Takeover (ATO) fraud.
  • Promote racially integrated housing.
  • Lower management costs.
  • Lower maintenance costs.
  • Internal controls to avoid opening fraudulent accounts.
  • Increase your Net Interest Income (NII) from P52 transactions.
  • Improves Know Your Customer (KYC) & Customer Due Diligence (CDD).
  • Form deeper customer relationships.
  • Fast ROI (compared to fraud costs).
  • Delivery of service very quickly.
  • Bank grade encryption.


Unregulated FIs

Non-Bank Banks Mortgage Division

Academy Mortgage

AmeriSave

Better Mortgage

Blend

Cross Country Mortgage

Fairway Independent Mortgage

Flagstar Bank

Guild Mortgage

Loan Depot

Navy Federal Credit Union

New American Funding

PNC Bank

Rocket Mortgage

U.S. Bank

United Wholesale Mortgage (UWM)

 

BENEFITS TO FIs

  • Bank grade encryption.
  • Delivery of service very quickly.
  • Fast ROI (compared to fraud costs).
  • Form deeper customer relationships.
  • Higher than expected net interest income (NII).
  • Implement private SoJOR™ to replace FHFA GSE participation of SPCP.
  • Improves Know Your Customer (KYC) & Customer Due Diligence (CDD)
  • Increase your Net Interest Income (NII) from P52 transactions.
  • Internal controls to avoid opening fraudulent accounts.
  • Lower maintenance costs.
  • Lower management costs.
  • Lower than expected noninterest expense.
  • Lower than expected provision for credit losses.
  • Promote racially integrated housing.
  • Provides data for private ‘Special Purpose Credit Program’ (SPCP).
  • Reduce Account Takeover (ATO) fraud.
  • Reduce Anti-Money Laundering (AML) fraud.
  • Reduce Application fraud at the new accounts desk.
  • Reduce synthetic identity theft fraud.
  • Reduce the racial wealth gap of income inequality.
  • Reduce your bad debt allowances due to fraud.
  • Reduces high concentration of minority residents.
  • Reduces high-density low-income areas.
  • We guarantee batch onboarding of max 1mil customers every 24 hours.
  • We seamlessly integrate with modern treasury and expense management software.
  • You benefit by offering a digital-first experience to your business CFO customers.
  • Your Commercial Card customers will not be poached away to FinTech virtual cards.


MORTGAGE INDUSTRY SOCIAL  IMPACT


AFFORDABILITY ISSUE

Ginicoe endorses H.R. 1745 - HOPE for Homeownership Act (2025/2026) (also referred to as the Humans Over Private Equity Act - Led by Sen. Jeff Merkley (D) Oregon & Rep. and Adam Smith (D) Washington State.


Primary Goal: Force hedge funds and alternative asset management firms, like Blackstone’s Invitation Homes - out of the single-family home market. 


It may be appreciated that the Ginicoe SoJOR housing component will supplicate this initiative. By initially destabilizing the price paid from racially integrating P52 and EA to break up clustered housing will reduce the current skewed artificially inflationary pressures on housing values; thereby compelling alternative asset managers, pension funds, hedge funds, private equity firms, insurance firms, Real estate investment firms or companies, Real estate investment trusts (REITs), Sovereign wealth funds, Syndicates and investment groups, and Venture capitalists to roll off these single family REO from their balance sheets. 


Key Penalties: Imposes a 15% tax on purchase prices (or $10,000, whichever is greater) for corporate investors purchasing single-family homes.


Divestment Strategy: Forces large owners (corporate entities) to sell off 10% of their currently owned single-family homes every year over a 10-year period, or face a $5,000 penalty per home.


Key Components: Eliminates tax depreciation and mortgage interest tax breaks for large institutional investors.



Revolving Credit Portfolio Benefits

  • Reduce card disputes at your call center.
  • Reduce synthetic identity theft fraud.
  • Reduce credit/debit card fraud.
  • Reduce Application fraud at the new accounts desk.
  • Reduce Anti-Money Laundering (AML) fraud.
  • Reduce Account Takeover (ATO) fraud.
  • Reduce ghost tapping.
  • Reduce card acceptance skimming.
  • Reduce Friendly Fraud.
  • Increase FI NII.
  • PCI DSS v04 CDE Compliance.
  • Bank grade encryption.


CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR)


MUNI BOND UNDERWRITERS

Municipal Liability for Political Violence

As far back as 1714, it was well established that municipal liability could deter citizens from participating in riots and political violence. This accountability would encourage local politicians and the affluent to discourage or prevent income inequality manifested from racially segregated Congressional Districts. It was deemed more equitable to distribute the costs of this violence across the entire community rather than burdening random victims.


If the affluent classes and insurance carriers must bear the costs of riots and political violence in the form of higher municipal taxes, higher insurance premiums, increased risk for political risk insurance (PRI), political violence insurance (PVI), Protest Insurance, standalone property terrorism insurance, or some combination thereof, it stands to reason that they should be more likely to bend their efforts, influence, moral persuasion, connections, and juice to ending racially segregated and clustered housing, often the underlying cause of political violence.  


When a guardian has property and family, they do not share the same pains and pleasures of the citizens. Thus, they seek to only serve themselves. This income inequality exacerbates corruption which reduces economic growth and undermines social services. The resulting inequality drives more corruption through bribery, fraud, deceit, and more self-dealing. while corruption disproportionately harms the poor, creating a vicious cycle often leading to political violence.


What Happened to the Correlation between Munis & Political Violence?

Municipal liability for riot damage was largely severed from old Riot Act statutes in the United States during the mid-to-late 20th century (prominently around 1967–1968). States began repealing statutes that held cities strictly liable for riot damage. For instance, Illinois and Louisiana repealed their laws in 1967.  This shift was caused by the rise of sovereign immunity, high financial burdens from civil unrest during that era, and the repeal of state-level riot acts, shifting liability from absolute municipal responsibility to private insurance or negligence claims.


In order to eradicate income inequality manifested from racially segregated Congressional Districts  underlying cause of political violence - we must hold municipalities accountable again. Why? Because political violence is the direct result of that municipality’s choice about resource allocation. Cited in large part from Harvard Law Review, Vol. 81, No 3, Jan 1968, pp 653-656; http://www.jstor.org/stable/1339512


We know that people are interested in integrating their housing because during the 1990s – 2000s when minority mortgage borrowers were hit with high cost and high interest rates known as predatory lending, even if with prime credit. And at the same time, white mortgage borrowers enjoyed low cost and low interest rates and began buying homes in historically minority clustered neighborhoods. Today we call this gentrification.


Defining Political Violence

Political violence (PV) is the use of physical force to achieve political goals, encompassing a broad range of acts including street fighting, riots, assassinations, property damage, and coups.  PV may target government officials or opposing activists.  Terrorism is a specific subset of PV, defined by premeditated, ideologically motivated violence targeting civilians or non-combatants to create fear and influence a wider audience. PV does not include peaceful demonstrations and assembly.



Mob violence or conspiratorial violence incited by a municipality, public official, individual, or business in their official or individual capacity that upsets the population balance pursuant to the SoJOR scoring between P52 and European-Americans (EAs) either expressly or indirectly or casually thereby affecting segregated housing issues, integrated housing issues, gentrification issues, or some facsimile thereof e.g. labor, education, voting, or commerce, etc. where the municipality, public official, individual, or business, in their official or individual capacity, had knowledge or contributory negligence that the violence was in progress.


Contributory negligent means if a person was injured or killed or if a property damage or wrongful death insurance claim is triggered for damages or if a civil suit or criminal action is filed in part due to the municipality, public official, individual, or business' acts of violence in their official or individual capacity's own negligence.



What Municipality Must Be Held Accountable?

Answer:  The whole current geographical Federal Electoral Congressional District  boundary that when backtracked to where the responsible person or persons spent the majority of their formative years of 0 – 12 years of age.

Ex:  George Zimmerman of Manassas, Virginia responsible for killing Trayvon Martin.  (Congressional District 10th of Virginia)  Enrique Tarrio of Miami’s Little Havana leader of the j6 insurrection of the proud boys (Congressional District Florida’s 27th).  Cole Tomas Allen of Torrence, California (Congressional District Ca 36 or 43) dependent upon the assailant's address. The 36th district generally covers coastal South Bay areas, while the 43rd covers inland areas. This is a pending investigation.


These events must be included in the official statement section titled “investment risk factors” or “investment considerations,” which currently provides limited information relevant to a buyer’s investment decision and is silent as to political violence risk. Ginicoe also promotes a new section titled 'Socially Responsible Investing' (SRI). This section would not be limited to social bonds, peace bonds, impact investing, ESG impacts, and similiar societal benefits.


Why Congressional Districts and not cities?

Answer:  Because . Congress dictates the tax-exempt status of interest earned on municipal bonds, making federal tax policy a key driver of local borrowing costs and infrastructure investment levels across districts.


MUNI BOND RATING AGENCIES 

Why is political risk and governance risk not used to rate bonds by Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSROs) such as Standard and Poor (S&P) Financial Services LLC, Moody’s, Fitch, Egan-Jones, A.M Best,  Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Ipreo LLC, Yield Curves, Indices and Similar Data, BVAL AAA Municipal Curve, BondWave AA QCurve, HIS Markit, S&P Opco, LLC, CUSIP Global Services, ABA, ICE Data Pricing & Reference Data, LLC, and others?


Answer:   Because they are bound by the prior models, they have in front of them.  For example, they only have, is the instance of unfunded pension liability; what is the statistical probability that the State or local issuer will default given the aforementioned macro assumptions.  Additionally, they get blind-sided by things that generally do not appear in the official statement (OS) of the municipality that must be filed with the SEC for the bond issue. Ex:  population balance upset index, Gini-coefficient score, SoJOR score, economic concentration, gentrification index, dissimilarity index, social impact metrics, and similar income inequality risk metrics all reporting to intercontinental exchange.


Research shows that high income inequality can negatively impact a region's economic growth and social cohesion, often leading to higher bond yields  resulting in higher borrowing costs for counties and states. 


Shift to Insurance Covered Entities

Political risks are faced equally by investors in insurance and reinsurance and investment fund portfolios. These political risks are part of the estimation and disclosure of risk factors revealed as property damage claims, usually hidden in an insurance company’s portfolio prospectus. The impact of political risk is considered to be long-term because the risk rises over time [think 400 years], given the greater potential for events and changes over time. Although political risk is extremely difficult to quantify, insurance companies and investors examine and understand, the potential for political risks by closely examining the location’s history [think south of the Canadian border], political parties and governance, and political forces at work in the region.


Hidden in plain sight in U.S. cities is the lobbying efforts to fortify the protective cloak of “qualified immunity”.  Put another way, it has been “qualified immunity” that has prevented the police of a municipality in clustered neighborhoods, such as Charlottsville, Ferguson, Miami Gardens, and similar municipalities, from being found guilty of murdering members of PLAHNET52 and that has served to protect insurance companies from paying out 42 USC §1983 wrongful death claims against the municipality.


It is that single trigger of the first Notice of a claim filed against the Municipal, State, County, Political Subdivision, Congressional District, Township, School, Village bond, Public Utility, Special Tax District, unincorporated area, or entire MSA (CRA assessment area) that imperatively MUST RESTORE THE CONNECTION to a bond downgrade by rating agencies down from investment grade to speculative.



 MUNICIPAL BOND UNDERWRITER’S AFFIRMATIVE COVENANTS
Point System for Bond Risk Rating new issuances [NYS DMV, State Farm™, and now Ginicoe all have point systems]


Violation

Action

First

downgrade to Upper Medium grade for 6 months. e.g. A1, A+

Second

within 2 years downgrade to investment or High Quality medium grade for 12 months. e.g Baa1, BBB+

Third

within 2 years downgrade to investment Low Quality medium grade for 18 months. e.g. Baa3, BBB-

Fourth

within 2 years downgrade to High Quality junk for 24 months. e.g. BB  or  C


Violators are provided a grace period to remedy the violation. If not corrected, creditors are entitled to announce default and demand immediate repayment of principal and any accrued interest.


Should the violator or violent event be on transportation equipment not limited to a car, train, plane, e-bicycle, or skateboard then the Muni that is affected is not where the violator was born, or where they currently live, but where they spent the majority of their formative years 0 - 12.



 

[1] 'Included is New Jersey where approximately 3,000 plaintiffs brought suit against the city of Newark in the aftermath of the summer of 1967 disturbances. The aggregate of the claims were approximately $6,ooo,ooo. Telephone conversation with Norman N. Schiff, Corporation Counsel of the City of Newark, Dec. 1, 1967. The statutes are: CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §7-IO8 (I958); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 25-3 (1965); Liabilities of Cities for Mob Actions, ch. 8o, §§ 1-2, [1967] Kan. Laws 2I2; Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.100 (1962); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. I7, § 3354 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 82, §§ 1-3 (1965) ;  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 8 (1959); Md. REV. STAT. §§ 537. 140-.160 (1959);  MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 11-1530, 94- 53I4 (1947) ;  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3I:53-55 (1955);  N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:48-1 to :48-7 (195I); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 1182I-26 (1956);  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 45-15-13 to -14 (1956);  S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-107 to -111 (1962); WIS. STAT. § 66.09I (196I).  New York also has a similar statute, N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW § 7I (McKinney I965), but it has been made inoperative. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 9193 (3) (McKinney I965). The statutes of California and Louisiana have been recently repealed. Ch. 1681, § I7, [1963] Cal. Stat. 3286;  No. 458, §  1, [I966] La. Acts 975

   

[2] Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, and Maryland.

   

[3] Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. Contributory negligent means if a person was injured in part due to his/her own negligence.

   

[4] Kentucky, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Wisconsin.

   

[5] E.g., Ch. 1519, § 1 – 5, [1854]  N.H. Laws 1416; Ch. 150, §§ 1 – 8 , [1864] N.J. Laws 237; No. 144, §§ 7 – 11, [1841] Pa. Laws 416.

   

[6] An Act for Preventing Tumults and Riotous Assemblies, and for the More Speedy and Effectual Punishing the Rioters, 1 Geo, 1, stat. 2, c. 5.  This statue succeeded an earlier statue which made a “hundred” (a social unit) liable for property damages caused by felonies if the felon was not presented within forty days. Statue of Winchester, 13 Edw. 1, stat, 2, c. 2 – 3 (1285).   See Feinstein v City of New York, 157 Misc. 157, 161, 283 N.Y.S. 335 (New York City Mun. Ct. 1935).  

   

[7] In four states, for example, the city is liable only for damages caused by a lynching mob. MINN. STATY. § 373.28 (1965); Neb. REV. STAT. §§ 23 – 1001 to – 1009 (1954);  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 162 – 23;  Ohio Rev Code Ann, §§  3761.01 - .05 (page 1954).   See also S.C. Const. art. VI § 6.  Also think Ferguson, Missouri; Charlottsville, Virginia; Cleveland, Ohio re:  Tamir Rice; Staten Island NY re: Eric Garner

   

[8] See Ratcliffe v Eden, 98 Eng. Rep. 1200 (K.B.. 1776)  (Lord Mansfield, J.); Legislation, Liability of the Municipality for Mob Violence, 6 Ford. L. Rev. 270, 273 (1937).

   

[9] Note, Communal Liability for Mob Violence, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1936);  See Roy v Hampton, 108 N.H. 51,    53, 226 A.2d 870, 872 (1967).  Indeed , several of the statues make municipal officials personally liable for riot damage if they neglect their duty to suppress a riot.  See, e.g. , Mont. Rev. Codes Ann, § 94 – 5314 (1947); N.Y. Gen. Munic. Law § 71 (McKiney 1965) ; Wis. State. § 66.091 (4) (1961).

   

[10] See Slaton v City of Chicago, 8 Ill. App. 2d 47, 58-59 N.E. 2d 205, 212 (1955); Note, Municipal Liability for Riot Damage, 16 Hast. L. Rev. 459, 461 (1965).